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Abstract The existence of non-local correlations between outcomes ofmeasurements
in quantum entangled systems strongly suggests that we are dealing with some form
of causation here. An assessment of this conjecture in the context of the collapse
interpretation of quantum mechanics is the primary goal of this paper. Following the
counterfactual approach to causation, I argue that the details of the underlying causal
mechanismwhich could explain the non-local correlations in entangled states strongly
depend on the adopted semantics for counterfactuals. Several relativistically-invariant
interpretations of spatiotemporal counterfactual conditionals are discussed, and the
corresponding causal stories describing interactions between parts of an entangled
system are evaluated. It is observed that themost controversial feature of the postulated
causal connections is not so much their non-local character as a peculiar type of
circularity that affects them.
Keywords Entanglement ·Counterfactuals ·Non-locality ·Causation ·Measurement ·
Dispositions · Relativity
1 Introduction: entanglement and non-local correlations
The phenomenon of quantum entanglement does not cease to intrigue and inspire
scientifically-oriented philosophers. The discovery of entangled systems has made a
lasting impression on our understanding of the inner workings of the world at the
fundamental level. Many authors insist that the ubiquity of quantum entanglement
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forces us to revise some of the basic concepts with which we attempt to describe
the fundamental features of reality. Among these affected are the notions of locality,
separability, individuality, causality, property and relation. Furthermore, it is quite
common for contemporary metaphysicians of the naturalistic stripe to use arguments
from quantum entanglement in strictly philosophical debates, such as discussions on
the status of the laws of nature and modality, or on reduction and emergence.1 In this
essay I am going to limit myself to discussing some metaphysical consequences of
the existence of perfect non-local correlations, which are one of the most recognizable
features of entangled states. My primary goal will be to investigate possible causal
explanations of this phenomenon, and to ascertain what amendments to the ordinary
concept of causation have to be made in order for these explanations to be successful.
An entangled state of two or more quantum systems is formally defined as a state
which cannot be factorized into the product of individual states. A generic example




where |0〉 and |1〉 are two orthogonal vectors in the appropriate one-particle Hilbert
space. Let us now select an observable O whose eigenvectors are |0〉 and |1〉, cor-
responding respectively to the values 0 and 1 for this observable.2 The standard
experimental setup that is used in this scenario involves two measurements of observ-
able O performed on individual components of this system at two distant locations
L and R.3 It is assumed that the locations of the two measurements are space-like
separated, i.e. no signal travelling at or below the speed of light can connect these two
events (see Fig. 1). Given the form (1.1) of the initial state of the two-particle system,
each measurement can reveal the values 0 or 1 with equal probabilities; however, the
outcomes obtained in bothmeasurements have to be perfectly correlated, meaning that
the values revealed in distant locations must be either two 1’s, or two 0’s. This corre-
lation does not appear to depend on the spatial distance between the two experiments;
it is supposed to hold regardless of how far away from each other the two particles are.
The insensitivity of the quantum correlations to the space-like separation between the
correlated systems is what justifies the use of the adjective “non-local”.
Given the enormous variety of the different conceptions of causal relations proposed
in the literature, we have to decide which philosophical analysis of causation to use
in our discussion of quantum non-local correlations. It seems that the counterfactual
analysis of causation, gaining so much popularity in recent years, would be the best
1 As an example seeMaudlin (2007) for arguments in favor of the claim that quantum entanglement violates
Humean supervenience, and Darby (2012) and Esfeld (2014) for attempts to defend the latter thesis.
2 To keep the discussion general, I am not making any specific assumption regarding the physical inter-
pretation of observable O and its eigenstates |0〉 and |1〉. This approach to quantum states and properties is
commonly adopted in quantum information theory (see e.g. Barnett 2009). The reader used to philosophical
discussions of entangled states involving spin of electrons or polarization of photons can reinterpret the
given formulas to make them more familiar.
3 To be entirely correct, the entangled state given in (1.1) should contain spatial degrees of freedom in order







Fig. 1 The spatiotemporal layout of measurement events in the case of two entangled particles (“L” and
“R” stand for “left” and “right”, respectively). Grayed areas represent the future and past light cones of
respective measurements. Dotted lines indicate two selected hyperplanes of simultaneity relative to some
frames of reference. Two curved lines designate the wordlines of the individual particles
choice.4 The main reason for this decision is that the counterfactual definition of
causation, as opposed to alternative approaches, does not rely on persistent and easily
identifiable features of common causal links that nevertheless may not be essential
for all forms of causality. These features include the spatiotemporal contiguity of
the cause and the effect (as per Hume’s version of the regularity approach), or the
presence of a transfer of energy, mass, or other conserved quantity. The counterfactual
account is flexible enough to accommodate causal links whose physical mechanisms
and external appearance may differ radically from ordinary, everyday causation, and
therefore seems well suited to deal with non-classical cases, to which the case of
quantum entanglement belongs. An alternative option which somemay find attractive,
given the enormous variety of competing conceptions of causality, is to altogether
abandon an analysis of quantum correlations in terms of causation, but we will not
follow this radical approach.
Stripped of all embellishments, themain question thatwill occupy us now iswhether
there is a causal link between distant components of an entangled quantum system.
However, this question cannot be properly addressed without first discussing the intri-
cate connections between causation, counterfactuals, and spatiotemporal relations.
Thus we will have to ascertain some consequences of the existence of non-local corre-
lations between quantum events for our understanding of counterfactual dependence
and causal dependence. While engaging in this conceptual analysis we have to keep in
mind that there are fundamentally two directions inwhich inferences can bemade here.
First and foremost, one can simply apply their favorite theories of counterfactuals and
4 I gauge the popularity of the counterfactual theory of causation by the number of papers on this subject
(including critical ones) that have been published in the last two decades. This is not to say that this approach
is without serious issues or formidable opponents. Collins et al. (2004) is a collection of the most influential
articles highlighting various philosophical aspects of the counterfactual approach to causation.
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causality to draw whatever their metaphysical implications may be regarding the case
of nomological correlations between space-like separated events. However, one could
equally well use the case in question as a testing ground for various philosophical
theories of counterfactual causality, and as a result pick those conceptions that deliver
preferred answers concerning the quantum case of non-local correlations. In our sub-
sequent analysis we will to a certain extent adopt both approaches, first eliminating
those philosophical analyses of counterfactuals/causality that deliver implausible ver-
dicts with respect to the case at hand, and then applying the remaining conceptions to
find the sought-after answers to the metaphysical questions concerning the nature of
quantum non-local phenomena.
The principal factual premise that wewill accept in subsequent investigations is that
there exist perfect correlations of a nomological kind (and thus not merely accidental)
between outcomes ofmeasurements carried out in distant locations. These correlations
may be expressed for instance in the form of the following law-like generalization:5
(1.2) If a system of two particles is prepared in the state (1.1), and measurements of
quantity O are performed for both subsystems, then the outcome of one such
measurement is 0 (1) iff the outcome of the other measurement is 0 (1).
Given this assumption, we are going to address the following two questions:
(1.3) Does the correlation expressed in (1.2) support the counterfactual conditional
“If the outcome of one measurement was 1 (0), the outcome of the other mea-
surement would be 1 (0)”?
(1.4) Does the truth of the counterfactual stated in (1.3) imply that there is a causal
link between the actually obtained outcomes of experiments performed in distant
locations?
The structure of the paper is as follows. In Sects. 2 and 3 we will focus on dis-
cussing problem (1.3). We will start off with presenting the basics of David Lewis’s
approach to counterfactuals, and we will identify the main difficulty that this semantic
analysis encounters in the context of non-local correlations set out in a relativistic
framework. Section3 introduces three main alternative semantics of relativistically-
invariant counterfactuals: one frame-dependent and two frame-independent, based on
the assumption of the fixity of the relativistic past. The frame-independent interpre-
tations further split into variants with and without miracles, which brings the overall
count up to six. It turns out that not all considered interpretations of counterfactu-
als support the conditional stated in (1.3). In Sect. 4 we will limit ourselves to those
semantics of the counterfactual that imply the existence of counterfactual dependence
between distant outcomes, and we will proceed to consider question (1.4). We will
identify the main challenge for proponents of the causal character of the non-local
correlations, in the form of the circularity problem. Section4 also briefly discusses
5 The assumption of the existence of perfect correlations between experimental outcomes is obviously
an idealization, as all realistic measurements are prone to various inaccuracies and experimental errors.
However, I take it that the biconditional expressed in (1.2) is a consequence of the quantum-mechanical
rules applied to state (1.1) which predict that the joint probability of the results (0, 1) and (1, 0) is zero.




and rejects an attempt to disconnect causation from counterfactual dependence by
adopting a modified variant of Lewis’s influence theory. In Sect. 5 we will shift atten-
tion to the different yet related question of whether a local measurement can causally
affect the distant part of the entangled system by altering its physical state. Adopting a
dispositional interpretation of quantum states together with a counterfactual reading of
dispositional properties, we will propose three causal models of non-local interactions
occurring as a result of measurements performed on one part of an entangled system.
The last section sums up the main results of the paper and highlights the non-standard
character of the three causal models developed in the paper.
2 Lewis’s counterfactual orthodoxy and its problems
It has become commonplace to explicate the meaning of counterfactual conditionals
in terms of possible worlds and the comparative relation of closeness (similarity).
The celebrated Lewisian truth conditions for counterfactuals can be spelled out as
follows: for a counterfactual conditional P → Q to be non-vacuously true there
has to be an antecedent-world wP such that Q is true in all antecedent-worlds at
least as close to the actual world as wP (Lewis 1973a). We will adopt this generic
reading of counterfactuals in subsequent discussions (with some exceptions of which
more later). However, we should stress that the precise meaning of counterfactual
statements is not determined until we decide how to interpret the requisite notion
of closeness (similarity) with respect to the actual world. Depending on the adopted
criteria of similarity we may end up accepting significantly divergent valuations of
counterfactual conditionals.
Lewis’s semantic analysis of counterfactuals is intimately connected with his pre-
ferred theory of causation. As he was an ardent proponent of the counterfactual theory
of causation, his main goal was to give a reductive analysis of a causal link between
two distinct events c and e in terms of the counterfactual “If event c hadn’t occurred,
event e wouldn’t have occurred”. But achieving this goal requires first and foremost
the elimination of so-called backtracking counterfactuals, i.e. counterfactuals whose
evaluation is based on some adjustments of the past events. Backtracking counterfac-
tuals not only seem to imply the possibility of causally affecting the past, but also
muddle the distinction between genuine causal links and non-causal correlations due
to the existence of a common cause (see Lewis 1973b). There are basically two ways
to avoid backtracking counterfactuals. One is to stipulate, using brute force, as it
were, that the antecedent-worlds closest to the actual world have to retain the same
past of the antecedent-event as in the actual world. In other words, we fix the past,
add the antecedent-event, and then evolve the world according to the actual laws.
In this approach all backtracking counterfactuals with no exceptions are eliminated
“by fiat”.
Another option is to come up with some criteria of similarity that would imply that
the majority of backtracking counterfactuals get rejected as a matter of fact (given
some contingent features of the actual world). This is the strategy pursued by Lewis
himself, who stresses that he would like to leave open the (unlikely) possibility that
some past events could counterfactually depend on the present facts (and thus that
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backward causation is not conceptually impossible, even though it is most probably
non-existent in our world). Lewis’s well-known criterion of similarity consists of an
intricate, multi-tiered mix of comparisons with respect to the violation of laws and the
differences in particular facts. In order to decide which of two given possible worlds
is more similar to the actual world we have to consider first whether there are “big and
widespread” violations of laws (“miracles” in Lewis’s terminology) in one of them.
If this criterion does not offer a definitive answer, we should then take into account
regions of perfect match of particular facts. Subsequent comparisons include small
violations of laws, and finally approximate similarity of particular facts (Lewis 1986,
pp. 47–48). Lewis claims that, given the de facto temporal asymmetry of our world,
the majority of backtracking counterfactuals are expunged by his criteria.6 That is, in
typical situations the closest antecedent-worlds will be those in which just before the
antecedent-event a small miracle happens, while all later events arise in accordance
with the usual laws. Such worlds are arguably closer to the actual one than the worlds
in which the past is adjusted for a lawful occurrence of the contrary-to-fact antecedent-
event, and also closer than the worlds in which the future is made identical to the actual
one by inserting miracles right after the antecedent-event.
In order to assess the suitability of Lewis’s counterfactual semantics as a conceptual
tool in our analysis of non-local correlations, we have to take into account both its
inherent strengths and weaknesses, and the way it performs when applied to the case
at hand. As many critics have observed, Lewis’s conception is controversial, to say the
least. In particular, it is not true that his criteria of similarity eliminate all backtracking
counterfactuals. As a matter of fact, we are forced to accept highly dubious backtrack-
ing counterfactuals of the form “If a occurred at t , then there must have been a small
miracle just before t” (see Maudlin 1994, ft. 5, p. 159). And it is not only the fact
that the consequent-event happens before the antecedent-event that raises the red flag
here. It is perhaps even more unsettling that virtually all counterfactual scenarios we
wish to contemplate must involve violations of the actual laws of nature. But to insist
for example that if Hillary Clinton had dropped out of the presidential race in May of
2015, the law of gravity would have to have been temporarily suspended, sounds at
best like a bad joke.7
Problems with Lewis’s analysis only mount up when we consider the case of per-
fect correlations between events that are space-like separated. It turns out that Lewis’s
combined criteria, when applied within the framework of special relativity, deliver a
6 However, this claim has been questioned on many occasions. See e.g. Bennett (1984), Elga (2001) and
Field (2003).
7 It may be objected that the alternative no-miracle semantics leads to equally implausible backtracking
counterfactuals of the kind “If Clinton had dropped out of the race, the past would have been different ten
million years ago”. I admit that the last counterfactual sounds strange, even though it is debatable which
of the two types of backtrackers is more offensive to our intuitions (I, for one, am perfectly happy with
accepting the latter kind). However, I believe that the discomfort associated with the counterfactuals of
the second kind can be explained away by pointing out that their truth is based on the doctrine of strict
determinism, which itself is not a common-sense view. If we are ready to accept the controversial thesis that
what happened millions of years ago predetermines Clinton’s current decision, small wonder that we end
up with an equally controversial-looking counterfactual pronouncement. On the other hand, the no-miracle
semantics produces no such aberrant counterfactuals once the assumption of determinism is dropped. So the
problem (if at all) seems to be caused not by the semantics but by the metaphysical doctrine of determinism.
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surprising verdict with respect to the possibility of counterfactual dependence between
such events. The verdict is that such dependence is virtually excluded out of hand.
Without going into details8 we can only observe that for the counterfactual “If the
outcome of measurement L had been 0, the outcome of measurement R would have
been 0” to be true in the world where both actual outcomes were 1, the world with
the two outcomes switched from 1 to 0 should be closest to the actual one of all
antecedent-worlds. However, it may be argued that the antecedent-world in which the
R-measurement still has the actual outcome 1 is closer according to Lewis’s criteria.
Even though a small miracle that breaks the correlation between the outcomes hap-
pens in this world, the gain is in the form of a much larger spatiotemporal area of
perfect match with the actual world (the additional area of match is the future light
cone of the R-measurement minus the future light cone of the L-measurement—see
Fig. 1). This argument is perfectly analogous to the relativistic variant of Lewis’s own
argument against backtracking, where admitting one small miracle was worth more
than adjusting an event in the past, because the latter strategy commits us to a world
with a much more widespread area of differences in particular facts.
Why should we take the verdict delivered by Lewis’s theory with respect to the case
of non-local correlations as speaking against its viability? After all, we will see in the
subsequent section that one of the alternative semantics for counterfactuals proposed
there has precisely the same consequence. The conclusion that there is no counter-
factual dependence between the distant outcomes in spite of them being perfectly
correlated may be slightly surprising, but in itself does not seem to be sufficient to
reject Lewis’s approach.9 However, the case at hand reveals a deeper problem with
Lewis’s truth criteria for counterfactuals. I claim that his method of comparing the
areas of (mis-)match with respect to particular facts was introduced specifically in the
context of the pre-relativistic conception of space-time and causation, and is therefore
ill-suited to deal with relativistic cases. In classical mechanics there is no upper limit
on the speed at which causal influences propagate, thus a change of a particular fact
at a moment t is in principle associated with some changes (however minute) in the
entire spatiotemporal region at all moments after t . Consequently, inserting a small
miracle in order to ‘erase’ some of the consequences of a contrary-to-fact event does
not seem to result in diminishing the area of mismatch with respect to particular facts.
Thus, in the case of two spatially separated, correlated and simultaneous events, keep-
ing the distant event unchanged while the local event was changed does not offer any
advantages in terms of the area of the perfect match of particular facts. Lewis’s theory
applied in the pre-relativistic framework predicts that the counterfactual connecting
alternative outcomes of distant measurements will be true. In the light of this obser-
vation, the opposite evaluation of the same counterfactual obtained in the relativistic
8 A more thorough analysis of the problem, together with some possible solutions, can be found in Bigaj
(2008). See also Bigaj (2006, pp. 93–96).
9 Fenton-Glynn and Kroedel (2015) insist that our intuitions regarding the counterfactual dependence
between space-like separated events are indecisive, and that our preferred theory of counterfactuals and




context looks more like a fluke than a genuine prediction of the theory.10 Taking this
into account, we should probably look for alternative semantics for counterfactuals
that would be tailor-made to work in the relativistic framework from the outset.
3 Fixing the past: with and without miracles
The alternative to Lewis’s analysis that was already mentioned earlier is the method
of evaluating counterfactuals based on the assumption of the fixity of the past. This
method can be easilymade relativistically invariant, which leads to its splitting into two
distinctive versions (for more details and a philosophical background see Bigaj 2004,
2006, chap. 5). One version is the following: in order to evaluate the counterfactual
P → Q, where P describes a well-localized event, we should consider possible
worlds which are identical with the actual world within the past light cone of the
P-event, in which P occurs, and which otherwise evolve according to the actual
laws of nature. Let us label this interpretation “the narrow fixed past”. The second
variant is essentially based on the same strategy, except nowwe “keep fixed” the entire
complement of the future light cone of the P-event (and, consequently, we can call
this approach “the broad fixed past”).11 It should be noted that both approaches admit
(and in some situations require) the possibility of violations of the laws (“miracles”);
however, these violations are limited to one specific instance only, namely to ensure
the occurrence of the counterfactual P-event in cases when a lawful occurrence of
this event would require adjustments in the absolute past (or the absolute elsewhere,
in the second strategy) of this event. Thus, for instance, if we assumed that our world
is strictly deterministic, all counterfactual suppositions would be analyzed in possible
worlds in which some laws are violated, as there is no other way to keep the absolute
past fixed while introducing a new event that doesn’t occur in reality. However, in an
indeterministic world, such as the world governed by the laws of quantum mechanics
under the collapse interpretation, a contrary-to-fact event may be introduced without
the need for miracles.12 In any case, the semantic analysis offered in this section does
10 Fenton-Glynn and Kroedel point out yet another peculiar feature of Lewis’s analysis (Fenton-Glynn and
Kroedel 2015, p. 59). They correctly observe that if we considered an entangled state involving a multitude
of space-like separated components, and not just two, then the number of miracles required to ensure the
perfect match outside the future light cone of the antecedent-event would be too big to be compensated for
by the gain in the match of particular facts. Consequently, in this case Lewis’s theory predicts that there is
a counterfactual dependence between space-like separated events. But it is rather strange to admit that the
existence of non-local counterfactual dependences is contingent on the number of objects involved.
11 Strictly speaking, we should further split the considered interpretations into distinct variants depending
on whether we elect to include or exclude the surface of the past (or future) light cone in the fixed region.
But these subtle distinctions will have no significant impact on subsequent discussions. For the sake of
completeness we will adopt the convention according to which in the broad fixed past approach we don’t
fix the surface of the future light cone, while in the narrow fixed past analysis we include the surface of the
past light cone in the fixed past (see Bigaj 2006, p. 186 ft 2). This means that in both approaches we treat
future events that can be reached from us via a light signal as “ontologically open”, and past events that can
send us a light signal as already “settled”.
12 However, we should keep in mind that even in the quantum-mechanical world there are some causal,




not require any presupposition regarding the deterministic or indeterministic character
of the world.
When we apply the above relativistic interpretations of counterfactuals to the case
of non-local correlations, it is straightforward to observe that in the narrow fixed past
variant the counterfactual connecting the alternative outcomes becomes true, while
under the broad fixed past interpretation it turns out false.13 This difference can be
intuitively explained by noting that in the first approach events space-like separated
from a given antecedent-event are treated as if they belonged to the open future,
whereas in the second variant they are included in the already fixed past.14 Of course
each decision can be seen as somewhat arbitrary, since technically events located at
a space-like separation from us are neither in our past nor in our future; they are
“elsewhere”. Thus perhaps a third approach is needed; and indeed such an approach
can be afforded in the form of the decision to relativize counterfactual valuations to a
particular inertial frame of reference. More specifically, the proposal is to consider a
given counterfactual as true in a particular frame of reference if the consequent is true
in all antecedent-worldswhich are identical with the actualworld at all times preceding
the antecedent-event relative to this frame, and which do not contain any law-violating
events after the antecedent-event.15 Applying this simple strategy to the case of non-
local correlations we can immediately see that the counterfactual “If the outcome of
measurement L had been 0, the outcome of measurement R would have been 0” is
true in all frames of reference in which the L-measurement temporarily precedes the
R-measurement, and false in frames where the temporal order between measurements
is reversed (see Fig. 1). The case when both measurements are simultaneous relative
to a particular frame can be conventionally included in either category.
We will postpone a discussion of the admissibility of the concept of frame-
dependent counterfactuals until the next section, devoted to the issue of causality.
For now let us note that all the fixed past approaches share with the original Lewisian
analysis the controversial feature resulting from the fact that in order to evaluate typi-
cal counterfactuals in deterministic scenarios we have to invoke law-violating worlds.
The only difference is that the fixed past approach assumes only one, “antecedent-
13 We are assuming here, in accordance with the dominant view, that the non-local quantum correlations
cannot be explained by a common cause operating in the joint past of both measurements (see Sect. 4
for further details). If there was a common cause affecting both outcomes of measurements and ensuring
their perfect correlations, the valuations of the alternative-outcome counterfactual would look significantly
different. In the first approach the counterfactual would not be true, since by keeping fixed the absolute
past of one measurement we also keep fixed the common cause which ensures that the other outcome is
exactly as in the actual world. However, under the second reading of counterfactuals the valuation of the
alternative-outcome counterfactual is the same (i.e. false) both with and without a common cause.
14 It may be argued that the broad fixed past approach trivializes the problem of counterfactual dependence
between space-like separated events, since such dependence is excluded from the outset by the stipulation
to fix the entire area outside the future light cone of the antecedent-event, regardless of what consequent-
event we consider. However, as we will see later in the text, the lack of counterfactual dependence does
not exclude the possibility that there may be a causal link connecting space-like separated events. For an
extended argument that there is no strong reason to prefer either the broad or the narrow fixed past approach
to counterfactuals, see Bigaj (2006, pp. 219–224).




introducing” miracle, whereas Lewis keeps open the possibility of considering worlds
with more miraculous events, as long as this is compensated by a substantial increase
in matching particular facts. Regardless of this difference, the need for law-breaking
events may be seen as a shortcoming, as we have argued in the previous section. As it
turns out it is possible to come up with semantic analyses that eliminate law-breaking
worlds altogether; however, such analyses are slightly more complicated than the
above-mentioned “fixing the past” strategies. Basically, the idea is to come up with
natural extensions of the two non-frame-dependent “fix the past” strategies described
earlier, in the sense that the new approaches would reduce to the old ones when the
considered antecedent-event is not determined by its past (where the past is identified
with either the past light cone, or the complement of the future light cone, depending
on the original approach). However, if there is a necessary nomological connection
between past events and the antecedent-event, we are not allowed to keep the whole
past of this event intact. The main premise of this approach is that the only accept-
able comparisons between alternative possible worlds should be with respect to the
spatiotemporal regions where differences in particular facts might occur.
The details of the no-miracle versions of the fixed past approaches need not concern
us. It should suffice to say that in the case of the broad fixed past analysis it is relatively
simple to comeupwith a similarity relation based entirely on the comparison of areas of
perfect match with respect to particular facts (for more on that see Finkelstein 1999;
Bigaj 2004).16 This similarity relation implies that when the antecedent-event of a
given counterfactual is not nomologically connected with any event outside its future
light cone, the valuation of this counterfactual will be precisely the same as under the
broad fixed past analysis. On the other hand, if the introduction of the antecedent-event
requires a modification of its (broad) past, the no-miracle approach to counterfactuals
will diverge from the miracle-based analysis. The appropriate similarity relation will
force us to consider possible worlds which lawfully accommodate the contrary-to-fact
antecedent event, andwhich diverge from the actualworld at the latest possiblemoment
(in a suitable relativistic sense of the word).17 One consequence of this analysis is that
the relation of similarity between possible worlds is no longer a linear ordering but
only a partial one (see Lewis 1981, p. 230; Bigaj 2004, p. 5 for details).
16 More specifically, the proposed similarity relation takes into account the earliest points at which a given
possible world diverges from the actual one, and considers the total area that is the sum of all future light
cones originating at these points. A world A is closer to the actual than a world B if the above-defined
area for A is properly included in the corresponding area of B. Note that the resulting similarity relation
is essentially equivalent to the relation of global comparative closeness defined by Placek and Müller in
their proposed semantics for counterfactuals within the framework of Nuel Belnap’s Branching Space-Time
theory (Placek andMüller 2007, pp. 182–183). While I have no space here to make a detailed comparison, I
would like to acknowledge that there are close analogies between Placek andMüller’s approach and the no-
miracle semantics based on the broad fixed past theory. One distinguishing detail, though, is that Placek and
Müller prefer to use a ‘local’ version of their theory in which counterfactuals, as well as their components,
are evaluated precisely at the same spatiotemporal location. This restriction makes it difficult, if not outright
impossible, to consider counterfactuals connecting events that occur at different (e.g. space-like separated)
locations.
17 But see Bennett (2003, p. 219) and Bigaj (2013, p. 627) for a discussion of some problematic cases
that can cast doubts on the soundness of the assumption that the worlds which diverge later from the actual
world should be considered closer to it.
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The task of finding a suitable extension of the narrow fixed past semantics presents
us with a greater challenge. I have proven in Bigaj (2004) that there is no similarity
relation of the Lewisian type (even if we admit partially ordering relations) which
could reduce to this method of evaluation for indeterministic events. The best we can
do is selecting, for each antecedent-event separately, a set of possible antecedent-
worlds in which the consequent has to be true in order for the counterfactual to be
satisfied. However, it turns out that this selection procedure will strongly depend on
what antecedent we consider, and for that reason we cannot rely on a predetermined
comparisonwith respect to the similarity to the actual world (Bigaj 2006, pp. 204–209,
2012a offer a step-by-step explanation of this strategy).
It can be easily verified that both no-miracle semantics produce the same valuation
for alternative-outcome counterfactuals connecting space-like separated measure-
ments (under the assumption that these outcomes are truly indeterministic events).
While the sets of possible worlds in which we should carry out such an evaluation dif-
fer in both cases, the net result is the same: the counterfactual comes out true. This result
is to be expected: after all, in the currently considered approaches no law-breaking
worlds are permitted, and thus an alteration of the outcome of one measurement must
be associated with a corresponding change in the other outcome.18
The price we have to pay for eliminating law-violating possible worlds is that
counterfactual dependence no longer implies causal dependence. It is now possible
to have two events such that if one did not occur, the other would not occur either,
without any causal link connecting the two. This may happen if both events have a
common cause in their joint past, in which case the relevant-antecedent worlds will
have a divergence point in the past, and the counterfactual will be evaluated as true. In
order to derive conclusions regarding the existence of a causal link we have to make
sure that such a situation is excluded. Thus, if we have two events A and B, and there is
a non-A-world such that B does not occur in it either, andmoreover both absolute pasts
of the locations of A and B are exactly as in the actual world, we can conclude that
there is a causal link between A and B. Unfortunately, the very fact that there is no such
world does not conversely imply that there is no causal link—it is still possible that
either event is separately caused by some occurrence in their joint past without there
being a common cause. Thus the currently considered conceptions of counterfactuals
can supply us with a sufficient, but not necessary condition for causality.
To sum up our analysis so far: we have come up in total with six possible variants
of counterfactual semantics that could be potentially applied to the case of non-local
quantum correlations. These are: Lewis’s original semantics based on the multi-tiered
set of comparisons, the three “fixed past” approaches (the frame-dependent approach,
the narrow fixed past and the broad fixed past semantics), and the two no-miracle
approaches (broad and narrow). Table 1 below lists all these approaches together with
their main features for quick reference.
18 We should add that the two no-miracle approaches currently discussed sometimes produce different
valuations of the same counterfactuals, so they are not generally equivalent. A typical example of such
a case is a counterfactual whose consequent refers to an indeterministic event occurring in actuality at a
space-like separation from the unrelated antecedent-event. Under the first interpretation the counterfactual
is true, but the second interpretation gives the opposite valuation.
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Table 1 Six alternative semantics of counterfactual conditionals
Approach Admits miracles? Admits backtracking? Evaluation of the alternative-
outcome counterfactual
Lewis’s semantics Yes, possibly
more than one
Usually not but in
some special cases
yes
False in the relativistic context but
true in the non-relativistic context
Frame-dependent
fixed past
Yes, only one No True in some frames of
reference and false in others
Narrow fixed past Yes, only one No True
Broad fixed past Yes, only one No False
No-miracle narrow No Yes True
No-miracle broad No Yes True
In the next section we will shift our attention to the problem of causation within
quantum entangled systems.
4 From counterfactual dependence to causality
Aswehave seen, the jury is still out regarding the truth of the counterfactual connecting
alternative outcomes of space-like separated measurements. Even though the majority
of the considered interpretations of counterfactuals imply that the distant outcomes are
indeed counterfactually dependent on each other, still there are available conceptions
that can cast doubt on this conclusion. In this section we will limit ourselves to the
interpretations that imply the existence of counterfactual dependence between distant
outcomes, in order to be able to discuss question (1.4) regarding the causal character
of this dependence.19 Can we confidently say that (given an appropriate reading of
counterfactuals) the outcome obtained in onewing of the apparatus causally influences
the other, distant wing and contributes to the creation of the outcome revealed there?
Are we ready to embrace the conclusion that causation in quantum mechanics can
overcome the limitations imposed by the requirements of special relativity and can
connect events that are too far away from each other to send and receive “conventional”
signals? Before we can attempt to formulate even tentative answers to these questions,
we should revisit the relevant facts.
We know that counterfactual dependence entails causality only for the right type
of counterfactual statements. Are the counterfactuals in question of the “right” type?
19 The concept of the counterfactual and causal dependence between distant outcomes is reminiscent of the
well-known distinction between two types of non-local influences in quantum entangled states: outcome
dependence and parameter dependence. Originally introduced (under different names) by Jarrett (1984), the
conditions of outcome independence and parameter independence are presented in the form of probabilistic
formulas stating that the local outcome is statistically independent from the distant outcome and from
the distant measurement setting. As is well known, the joint assumption of outcome independence and
parameter independence leads to Bell’s inequality. Quantum mechanics violates outcome independence,
but preserves parameter independence. The latter result can be confirmed in our counterfactual analysis, as
the counterfactual “If a different observable had been measured at L , the outcome obtained at R would be
different” is clearly wrong. For criticism of the philosophical meaning of Jarrett’s distinction see Maudlin
(1994, p. 95ff) and Bigaj (2006, pp. 47–58).
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It seems that indeed they are. In the narrow fixed past approach we’ve made sure that
no backtracking is permitted, and hence non-causal counterfactual dependencies (via
a common cause) are excluded. In the two remaining “no-miracle” approaches back-
tracking is allowed, and this means that generally speaking counterfactual dependence
does not guarantee the existence of a direct causal link. However, in the specific case
that we are considering, an additional assumption is believed to be satisfied: no adjust-
ment of the joint absolute past of both measurements is necessary in order to introduce
alternative outcomes of the experiments. Therefore no explanation of the outcome-to-
outcome counterfactual dependence in terms of a common cause is available, and the
path to direct causation stands wide open.20
But are we sure that there is no common cause? Here the verdict is up to physics,
not philosophy. Given the existence of perfect correlations between outcomes, the
only possibility for a local, common-cause explanation is in the case when an event
in the joint past of the measurements determines both outcomes beforehand. But we
know from Bell’s theorem that any deterministic theory which is also local produces
experimentally testable consequences that are not borne out by experience.21 Standard
quantum mechanics (in the form of the collapse interpretation) rejects determinism,
and therefore avoids the clash with experiment, while its main contender, Bohmian
mechanics, embraces non-local influences as a price for its determinism. But either
way, it seems that non-local causal links are unavoidable in both approaches.
Or are they? Here philosophers are likely to make the following complaint. We
have proven so far that according to several compelling accounts of counterfactuals,
the alternative-outcome counterfactuals come out true in a way that makes it almost
inevitable that their truth should be underpinned by a legitimate causal link. But we
have ignored one inconvenient fact: the counterfactual outcome-outcome dependence
goes in both directions. The situation is entirely symmetric: we may equally well say
that had the L-outcome been 0, the R-outcome would have been 0, or vice versa.
Consequently, we have to accept the fact that the L-outcome causes the R-outcome,
and the latter reciprocates, causing the former in turn. But is this even intelligible?
Isn’t it part of how we understand the words “cause” and “effect” that an effect cannot
cause its own cause? And when we add to that the additional assumption of transitivity
(which, it has to be admitted, has been questioned by several authors), we end up with
a clear case of causa sui, so dreaded by all metaphysicians.22
Some authors try to skirt this problem by doing a bit of terminologicalmaneuvering.
Instead of talking about causal links, let us say that distant outcomes in an entangled
20 To be entirely accurate, the fact that the joint absolute past of the measurements can be fixed does not
guarantee that there is no common cause of both outcomes located somewhere outside this area. But in that
case we would have a non-local causal influence anyhow, since the purported common cause would have
to be space-like separated from at least one measurement (see Maudlin 1994, p. 131).
21 The classical source on Bell’s theorem is of course the collection of articles (Bell 1987). A particularly
thorough analysis of the philosophical implications of Bell’s theorem can be found in Butterfield (1992b).
22 This point is made in Kistler (2006, pp. 48–49). Among the authors that question the transitivity of
the causal relation is Hall (2000). Fenton-Glynn and Kroedel (2015, p. 68) suggest that we should accept
a limited version of transitivity which applies to distinct events only, thus forestalling the derivation of
self-causation in the quantum case.
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system are causally implicated with one another.23 The relation of being causally
implicated is assumed to be symmetric from the outset, so no harm is done. However,
this solution strikes me as being rather disingenuous. I can see two legitimate reasons
for using the “directionally-neutral” causal terminology. One is when the events in
question are not directly causally linked, but are part of a broader causal network.
A clear example of such a case is the common cause scenario, and of course there
can be more complex causal connections involving the events in question. But clearly
there is no reason to hedge our bets in such a way in the case of quantum non-
local correlations between outcomes. We know for sure that there is a direct (and
bidirectional) counterfactual dependence here, and we don’t know of any other events
that would participate in a broader causal network together with the outcome-events.
The second possible justification for the use of the non-directional term “causally
implicated” is that we don’t know yet which event is a cause and which an effect—all
we know is that one of them caused the other one. But again the ignorance scenario
does not apply to our case, as we already know (given all the required assumptions)
that one event causes the other, while the other causes the first event back.
At this moment we should recall one particular interpretation of counterfactuals
that may be able to break the impasse here. Namely, it is the interpretation which
relativizes the truth value of a given counterfactual to a frame of reference. According
to this approach, it is never the case that both counterfactuals connecting alternative
outcomes are true in the same frame. If we select a particular frame of reference
in which the L-measurement temporarily precedes the R-measurement, the counter-
factual dependence goes from the former to the latter, and so does the causal link.
However, in a different frame where the temporal relation between measurements is
reversed, it is the outcome of the R-measurement that causes the other outcome. So
there is no description of the entire systemwhichwould require us to admit that there is
a causal loop there. Causality is always unidirectional, only it can change its direction
when we move from one “perspective” to another one.
Promising as this strategy may be, it is nevertheless far from being entirely immune
from legitimate objections. Themost controversial aspect of this approach is associated
with the commonly accepted view that features which are frame-dependent do not
reflect the objective nature of reality but aremere “artefacts” of our description.Andyet
causation seems to be one of the most fundamental, objective relations that constitute
the metaphysical “ground floor”, so to speak. It is difficult to accept that the fact that
one event causes another should depend on one’s adopted perspective. One may try to
rebut this objection by pointing out that in the current approach it is not the causal link
but merely its direction that is frame-dependent (see Laudisa 2001, p. 229 for a similar
view). But this is a mere word-play. It remains the case that in one frame of reference
event A causes event B, while in another frame A is no longer a cause of B. We can
cut this any way we want, but we can’t deny that according to the current proposal the
causal link leading from A to B can be made to disappear by simply switching from
one conventional description of reality to another.
23 This terminology is used in Maudlin (1994) and Laudisa (1999).
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Given these quandaries, it may be advisable to look again at the purported connec-
tion between counterfactual dependence and causality. Aren’t we missing something
here? Is there perhaps a third factor that has to be thrown in in order to get from the
former to the latter? Is counterfactual dependence really sufficient for causality? As
it turns out, there is an alternative conception of causation that seeks to explicate this
notion in terms of a relation more intricate than simple counterfactual dependence.
This relation, introduced in Lewis (2000, 2004), is known as “influence”. Without
going into unnecessary details we can characterize influence broadly as follows. An
event A influences an event B, if small counterfactual variations of A are associated
with small variations of B. By small variations Lewis means changing some properties
of a given event without actually affecting its identity, or replacing the event with its
non-identical and yet similar variant, or finally eliminating the event altogether.24 All
such changes of the cause should be accompanied by similar changes in the effect.
Typical examples of counterfactual variations of everyday-life causes include chang-
ing the time and location of the cause, changing the manner in which the cause is
brought about, or changing some of the quantitative parameters characterizing the
cause (such as the strength and/or direction of the applied force).
Lewis insists that counterfactual dependence constitutes a special case of the relation
of influence (Lewis 2004, pp. 91–92), and if we agree with this assessment, then the
cases of counterfactual dependence between distant outcomes of measurements will
be immediately classified as instances of influence. However, it is debatable whether
the notion of influence defined as above indeed covers counterfactual whether-whether
dependence as its special case.25 At any rate, we can always specify the relation of
influence in such a way as to exclude the case of pure counterfactual dependence.
We will then interpret Lewis’s theory as follows: we demand that for an event A to
influence an event B there has to be a non-empty set RA of alterations of A not limited
to its total elimination, and a non-empty set RB of alterations of B such that each
element of RB counterfactually depends on an element in RA. Moreover, we stipulate
that RA contains arbitrarily small alterations which are nevertheless mapped onto non-
zero alterations from RB . Thus no matter how small an alteration of A is, it will be
accompanied by a non-zero alteration of B.
It may be interesting to check whether the relation of influence thus defined holds
between outcomes of measurements in the case of quantum entangled systems. And
it is not difficult to observe that most likely there is no influence in the quantum case.
Changing slightly the time and/or location of one measurement-and-outcome event
clearly does not affect the corresponding characteristics of the other measurement and
its outcome. Similarly, insignificant changes in the manner in which one experiment
is performed (as long as the outcome stays the same) are not associated with the same
types of changes in the other experiment. It is difficult if not outright impossible to think
of any measurable parameter characterizing one measurement and its outcome whose
alteration would change the corresponding parameter of the distant measurement. It
24 The concept of a “small” change is left intentionally vague by Lewis, in keeping with his broad view
that the concept of causality itself is vague and admits various inequivalent precisifications.
25 For an argument against Lewis’s claim regarding the relation between counterfactual dependence and
influence see Bigaj (2012b, pp. 10–11).
123
Synthese
is true that the special alteration of one outcome in the form of substituting in its place
an alternative result will counterfactually change the distant outcome. However, this
alteration amounts to the total elimination of the actual outcome, and we need more
subtle alterations as well in order to talk about influence in the above-defined sense.
Hence we may confidently say that one outcome of measurement does not influence
the other in the technical sense of the term. And if we accept the proposed version
of Lewis’s latest theory of causation, there can be only one conclusion: no causal
link connects distant outcomes of experiments in the quantum-mechanical case of
entangled systems.
As always, this is a big “if”. Lewis’s influence theory of causation has met with
a barrage of criticism.26 The main accusation leveled is that there are cases of unde-
niable causal links which nevertheless fail to satisfy the conditions of influence.
One prominent category of such counterexamples involves cases in which a condi-
tion is created that later enables some independent chain of events to come to its
conclusion. Clearing a forest can causally contribute to a much later avalanche’s
destroying a village, and yet there is no relation of influence that connects the act
of clearing with the event of destroying the village, apart from ordinary counterfac-
tual dependence (if the forest had not been cleared, the avalanche would have been
stopped and the village would have been saved). Can this run-of-the-mill example
throw some light on the bizarre case of quantum entangled systems? I claim that it
can.
Actually, it may be argued that quantum non-local correlations are underpinned
precisely by the sort of causal links that serve as counterexamples to Lewis’s theory
of influence. According to the collapse interpretation of quantum mechanics (whether
in the orthodox, Copenhagen version, or in the modern GRW guise) the local mea-
surement initiates an (almost) instantaneous reduction of the global state of the system
which, given the entangled form of the initial state, results in a change of the state
of the distant part of the system. The distant subsystem acquires a state which is the
eigenstate of the relevant observable, and this state in turn is responsible for reveal-
ing the precise value of the observable that is correlated with the outcome obtained
locally. Thus we have here a clear case of creating the right conditions which enable
the faraway system to reveal the expected outcome in an independent process of mea-
surement. No wonder, then, that there is no relation of influence between the two
outcomes. But this fact does not prove that non-local causality is absent in the whole
experimental setup.
At this point it should become clear that we can’t expect to make any further
progress without delving deeper into the physical mechanism responsible for the
occurrence of the experimentally verified perfect correlations between distant out-
comes of measurements. In the next section we will look closer into how standard
quantum mechanics describes the process of measurement and its effects on systems
in entangled states.




5 Quantum dispositions and non-local causation
Let us nowshift our attention from the correlations betweenoutcomes of two space-like
separated measurements to an even simpler setup involving only one local measure-
ment. Suppose that a measurement of observable O with eigenstates |0〉 and |1〉 has
been performed on the L-subsystem of the entire system prepared in state (1.1).
According to the collapse interpretations of quantum mechanics, immediately after
the measurement the entire system rapidly changes its state from the initial entangled
state (1.1) to one of the two product states |0〉|0〉 or |1〉|1〉. This, in turn, means that
both subsystems acquire new states that haven’t been possessed earlier. In particular,
as a result of the local L-measurement the distant R-system finds itself in one of the
two eigenstates for observable O . Our task now will be to assess whether this pro-
cess deserves to be categorized as a non-local causal interaction between the local
measurement and the distant system.27
It can be useful to clarify some potentially confusing issues first. Somebody could
object that we can’t speak about genuine non-local causality here, since the purported
effect is not an observable event. Indeed, quantum-mechanical states are not directly
observable, so there is no way for us to experimentally verify if (and when) the state
of the distant subsystem collapsed into an eigenstate of O . But we are engaged here in
doing metaphysics of science, not epistemology. As long as our theory uses the con-
cept of states to characterize physical systems, we have the right to at least consider
the possibility of interpreting the state of a system as one of its objective properties.
And any process that changes an objective property of an entity can be potentially
treated (barring possible arguments to the contrary, of which more later) as a causal
one, regardless of whether the property in question is observable or not. The above-
mentioned confusion may have something to do with the emphasis that is sometimes
put on non-local signaling rather than non-local causality. Indeed, no superluminal
signal can be sent using local measurements in quantum entangled systems, precisely
because the purported change in the state of the distant system is not directly observ-
able. But this should not be mistaken for the impossibility of non-local causation.
The central problem that we should zero in on now is the nature of a quantum-
mechanical state. Various interpretations of this key concept abound. In some
approaches states (encompassed in wave functions) are objectified as some sort of
physical fields that can interact with other objects, while in other conceptions states
merely serve as computational devices for calculating expectation values for differ-
ent observables. However, one possible interpretation of quantum mechanical states
stands out prominently. Several authors have noted that quantum states display a strik-
ing dispositional nature: they tell us what would happen, had we decided to perform
such and suchmeasurements.28 Dispositions associatedwith a given state are typically
27 However, we should keep in mind that so far there is no satisfactory relativistically invariant account
of the measurement process in quantum mechanics. See Barrett (2014) for an extensive discussion of this
problem.
28 Dispositional interpretations of quantum states are advocated for various reasons e.g. in Suárez (2007),
Dorato (2007) and Bigaj (2012c). However, see Dorato (2011) for a detailed argument for the thesis that
the dispositional account of properties can be helpful only in the context of some specific interpretations of
quantum mechanics, such as the GRW approach.
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probabilistic, but in special cases when the state is an eigenstate of a given observ-
able, the corresponding disposition is deterministic (“sure-fire”). This is precisely the
case in our example: the distant system seems to acquire a deterministic disposition
to reveal a particular value (1 or 0) in an appropriate measurement.
A detailed analysis of the metaphysical controversies surrounding the concept of
dispositional properties is beyond the scope of this article. However, I would like to
put at ease those who are ill-disposed to dispositions by pointing out that the only
substantial assumption that we will borrow from the standard approach to dispositions
is the conditional analysis of dispositional properties in terms of their stimulus and
manifestation, plus the additional premise that the link between the stimulus and the
manifestation is expressed by the counterfactual conditional (in one of the available
interpretations discussed earlier). In particular, we don’t need to enter the heated debate
on the existence of fundamental irreducible dispositions and their purported role in
grounding the laws of nature. Essentially, we are here following the lead of Ghirardi
and Grassi (1994, p. 404) who propose to explicate possessing a definite value a of
a given observable O by a physical system p with the help of the counterfactual
conditional “If O was measured on system p, the result would be a”. Ghirardi and
Grassi don’t even use the word “disposition” in their analysis, while I resort to this
term of art as a mere convenience (shorthand for “counterfactually interpreted definite
value of an observable”).
After these explanationswe can nowdeploy the formalism of counterfactual seman-
tics in order to asses some intuitive claims regarding entangled systems and their
properties, startingwith the seemingly unassailable assumption that the local measure-
ment indeed causes the occurrence of the corresponding disposition at a space-like
separated location. Under closer scrutiny it turns out that this claim is not as iron-
clad as it may seem, and the reason again is the ambiguity inherent in our concept of
counterfactuals. To see this, we should consider the truth of the disposition-expressing
counterfactual “If the R-measurement was performed, the outcome would be 0” under
the assumption that in the actual world the L-measurement has been done at a space-
like separated location, and its revealed outcome has been 0. In order to accomplish that
we have to take into account appropriate possible worlds in which the R-measurement
is carried out, but of course the exact form of these worlds depends on the adopted
semantics. As we recall, there are basically three options here: we can keep fixed the
past light cone of the R-measurement, or we can fix the complement of its future light
cone, or we can relativize counterfactuals to a particular frame of reference.29 It is
easy to observe that only in one of these three approaches the considered counterfac-
tual comes out true, namely when we decide to keep the complement of the future
light cone fixed. In contrast to that, when we fix the past light cone only, the actual
L-outcome, and indeed the very measurement on the L-system, cannot be guaranteed
to occur (as they are not determined by the absolute past of the R-location). The third
solution is to admit that the appropriate disposition exists only in those frames of
reference in which the L-measurement temporarily precedes the moment of time at
29 As we are dealing here with antecedent-events (i.e. measurements) that are typically assumed to be free-
choice occurrences not affected by the past, we don’t have to separately consider counterfactual semantics
that do not admit miracles.
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which we consider the disposition of the R-system. Again, as we have already indi-
cated, the problem with this approach is that it treats as perspective-dependent facts
that are typically seen as objective (in this case the existence or non-existence of a
dispositional property of a system).
But how can we take seriously a conception that flat-out denies that a measure-
ment on one subsystem of an entangled system must be accompanied by the change
of the state on the other, space-like separated subsystem? Doesn’t this contradict the
assumed principles of quantum mechanics (under the collapse interpretation)? And,
even worse, doesn’t this approach imply the possibility of the violation of perfect
law-like correlations between outcomes? As we will see, these worries are entirely
unfounded. First of all, no violation of perfect correlations is implied by denying the
existence of the deterministic disposition of the distant system. The lack of the appro-
priate disposition means that the measurement on the R-system can reveal an outcome
other than 0 (i.e. 1), but in possible worlds in which this happens the L-measurement
will not yield the value 0. Actually, there may not even be a measurement on the L-
system at all! As for the collapse postulate that we have explicitly adopted in current
discussions, its precise implementation depends on additional assumptions regard-
ing the spatiotemporal relations between two measurements: the actual measurement
performed on the L-system, and the possible R-measurement aimed at actualizing
the (purported) disposition. No-one would question the fact that if we selected a spa-
tiotemporal point on the world-line of the R-system that is located absolutely earlier
than the L-measurement (in the intersection of the two past light cones of L and
R—see Fig. 1), no deterministic disposition would be present there, since at this point
the collapse has not yet occurred. Similarly, it is unquestionable that the appropriate
disposition must be present at all points that are located in the absolute future of the
L-measurement. But the controversial case is precisely when the selected point is
assumed to be space-like separated from the L-measurement. The intuition behind the
narrow fixed past approach is such that from the perspective of the counterfactually
considered R-measurement, the actual L-measurement has not yet taken place (it’s
still in the “future”, metaphorically speaking). Thus there are two possible outcomes at
location R, and therefore the disposition is not present. Needless to say, the alternative
broad fixed past approach sees things differently.
However, an interesting question remains. How can we explain the existence
of perfect correlations between space-like separated outcomes of measurements,
if the L-measurement does not produce a sure-fire disposition of the R-system to
reveal the same outcome? An off-the-cuff answer may be that because, as we have
observed above, the L-measurement seems to happen “later” than the counterfactual
R-measurement, it would be the R-measurement which would (if performed) produce
an appropriate disposition at the location of the L-measurement, thereby securing the
required correlation. But this is incorrect. The entire situation is completely symmetric.
No measurement can produce any sure-fire disposition at a space-like separated loca-
tion, since from the perspective of this location themeasurement is non-existent. Under
the considered interpretation of counterfactuals the correlations cannot be explained
by the action of onemeasurement on the pre-measurement state of the other subsystem.
I can see only one way out of this predicament if we insist on finding causal
explanations of observable phenomena, as we do throughout the paper. We have to
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admit that indeed the perfect correlation between outcomes is a result of a spooky,
unmediated, non-local and bidirectional causal link connecting the two events. This
suggestion is confirmed by the fact that under the very same interpretation of coun-
terfactuals the alternative-outcome counterfactuals come out true, strongly hinting at
the existence of direct causation between distant outcomes. Thus the story offered
under one possible resolution of the ambiguity of spatiotemporal counterfactuals is
that immediately before the R-measurement the particle is not in an eigenstate for
the measured observable O , so when we limit ourselves to the local situation only,
two outcomes of the measurement are possible. However, the outcome revealed in
the distant L-measurement has the capability to causally and non-locally affect the
R-outcome precisely at the moment of the R-measurement, hence the perfect corre-
lation is secured without the need to adjust the quantum state of the R-system before
the measurement.30
On the other hand, the story given by the alternative broad fixed past approach
is different. Here measurements are capable of creating sure-fire dispositions at dis-
tant locations; however the counterfactual connecting alternative outcomes is false.
Thus the causal explanation for correlations is as follows: one measurement creates
the sure-fire disposition to reveal the correlated outcome on the distant system, and
subsequently the other measurement confirms this outcome. There is no direct coun-
terfactual dependence between outcomes. However, there is a chain of counterfactual
dependencies, first between the L-measurement (together with its outcome) and the
disposition of the R-system, and next between the disposition and the revealed out-
come.31 Thus if we accepted Lewis’s definition of causation as the transitive closure of
30 This causal story displays a striking resemblance to cases of so-called finkish dispositions known from
the literature on the metaphysics of dispositional properties (see Bird 2007, pp. 25–26 for an overview).
Finkish dispositions provide counterexamples to the “naïve” conditional analysis of dispositions in the form
of cases in which either there is a particular disposition which cannot be manifested due to a fink, or there
is no disposition but the entire setup guarantees that the appropriate manifestation will be present. The
above-discussed story appears to belong to the second category of cases, as we have argued that there is no
disposition of the R-system to reveal a given outcome, and yet the L-measurement secures the occurrence
of one particular value. However, this case does not necessarily undermine the conditional analysis of
dispositions, since the appropriate “local” counterfactual that takes into account only R-measurements is
false, in line with the assumption of the non-existence of the underlying dispositions. On the other hand,
the counterfactual that includes the occurrence of the L-outcome in its antecedent does come out true, but
this counterfactual represents a “global” disposition of the entire system, rather than the local disposition of
the R-system. The underlying difference between local and global dispositions can be spelled out in terms
of the difference in the spatiotemporal location of the triggering event (stimulus). The local disposition of
the R-system involves the local measurement event as the triggering factor, while the global disposition of
the entire system makes reference to the stimulus event that consists of both the R-measurement and the
L-measurement together with its actual outcome.
31 I have no space here to discuss one possible objection to the existence of a causal link between a mea-
surement event on one subsystem and the occurrence of an appropriate disposition on the other subsystem.
The objection I have in mind is based on the claim, put forward by many authors (e.g. Esfeld 2001, 2004;
Ney 2010), that subsystems of an entangled system possess only extrinsic properties, i.e. properties whose
possession by an object depends on the existence of other objects in the universe. The extrinsicness argu-
ment against the causal link alleges that the change brought about in the distant part of the system by the
local measurement is a mere “Cambridge” change, similar to the change I “induce” in the Eiffel tower by
moving fifty feet away from it (since now the tower has the property of being fifty feet away from me). I
believe that the extrinsicness argument applied to the quantum case is wrong for various reasons, but I have
to leave its detailed analysis for another occasion.
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the relation of counterfactual dependence, we would have to admit that ultimately the
distant outcomes are causally connected with, albeit not counterfactually dependent
on, one another.
Let us finally note that each story suffers from a singular case of causal (or explana-
tory) circularity. The circularity affecting the causal interpretation of the non-local
correlations under the narrow fixed past approach has been already identified earlier
in the text. As in this approach each outcome is counterfactually dependent on the
other one, the causal link between distant outcomes is symmetric and thus clearly
circular. Under the alternative, broad fixed past interpretation the circle is perhaps
less conspicuous, but no less worrisome. In the scenario when two measurements are
performed we can pick any measurement (let’s say R) and its outcome o and verify
that this measurement causes the occurrence of the L-system disposition to reveal the
same value o. On the other hand, the L-disposition together with the local measure-
ment are causally responsible for the actualization of the outcome o. The circularity
comes to the surface when we note that there is an alternative and equally acceptable
causal story that starts with the L-measurement and its outcome and proceeds through
the creation of the appropriate R-disposition to the occurrence of the R-outcome. The
ensuing circle can be then expressed as follows: in order to explain why the outcome
of the R-measurement was o we can first point out to the existence of the corre-
sponding disposition (eigenstate), which in turn was brought into being by the distant
L-measurement and its outcome. However, the L-outcome is similarly explained by
the chain of events starting with the R-measurement and its outcome. This closes the
explanatory and causal circle.
6 Conclusion: three causal stories
Themain goal of this articlewas to offer an analysis of causal interactionswithin entan-
gled quantum systems under the counterfactual interpretation of causality. The first
step of this analysis was a search for a semantics of counterfactual conditionals with
the help of which we could properly evaluate counterfactuals connecting space-like
separated events.We have distinguished no less than six inequivalent interpretations of
counterfactuals that could be used to describe the observed correlations betweendistant
parts of an entangled system. Of these six interpretations three have been selected as
the most promising candidates for explicating counterfactual and causal dependence
between space-like separated measurement events. All three approaches follow the
intuition that in order to evaluate a counterfactual whose antecedent refers to a local-
ized event, we have to keep the past of this event exactly as in the actual world. But
they differ in how we are supposed to define the past in accordance with the principles
of relativity. This can be done as follows: we can define the relativistically-invariant
past of an event as the interior of its past light cone (the narrow fixed past), as the
exterior of its future light cone (the broad fixed past), or as the region consisting of all
spatiotemporal points temporarily preceding the selected event in a particular frame
of reference (the frame-dependent approach).
The three alternative interpretations of counterfactuals diverge with respect to their
verdict regarding the counterfactual dependence between distant outcomes of mea-
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surements in an entangled system. One of them (the narrow fixed past) implies that the
outcomes are counterfactually dependent, the second (broad fixed past) that they are
not dependent, and the third that their counterfactual dependence is frame-relative.
Consequently, under the standard Lewisian approach to causation the first of the
above semantics implies that there is a direct causal link between distant outcomes
of measurements. However this link displays some non-standard features, such as
symmetricity, and (arguably) reflexivity. Faced with this challenge, we have explored
an alternative to the standard counterfactual analysis of causation in the form of a
modified version of Lewis’s theory of influence. Though it may be argued that the
relation of influence does not hold between distant outcomes of measurements, it is
too hasty to draw from this fact the conclusion that there is no causality involved here,
since there are many legitimate instances of causation that similarly lack the required
features of influence. Hence the holding of the relation of influence does not seem to
be a necessary condition for causation. On the other hand, the lack of counterfactual
dependence between distant outcomes under the broad fixed past interpretation does
not exclude the possibility of a causal link, since causation is typically defined as the
transitive closure of the relation of counterfactual dependence.
Continuing our search for causal mechanisms responsible for the non-local cor-
relations in quantum entangled systems, we have posed the question of whether a
measurement performed on one subsystem of an entangled system can have an effect
on the state of the other subsystem even when this subsystem is not subject to any
measurement. In order to make this question more tractable, we have made several
interpretational assumptions. In addition to adopting the postulate to reduce the cause
and effect link to counterfactual dependence, we have also decided to interpret an
eigenstate of a particular observable in terms of the sure-fire disposition of a system to
reveal the corresponding value of the observable undermeasurement. The dispositional
properties, in turn, are assumed to be analyzed in terms of counterfactual conditionals
“If ameasurement was performed, the outcomewould be such-and-such”. Under these
assumptions the broad fixed past approach to counterfactuals predicts that revealing
a particular outcome in one measurement is followed by a change in the state of the
other subsystem. On the other hand, under the narrow fixed past analysis the local
measurement does not affect the state of the distant subsystem. The frame-dependent
approach to counterfactuals relativizes the existence of an appropriate disposition to
the inertial frame of reference in which the counterfactual is evaluated.
The key result of our investigation into the causal underpinnings of quantum non-
local correlations seems to be that there are three alternative causal stories that can
be given here, each associated with a particular way of resolving the ambiguity of
relativistically-invariant counterfactuals. Each of these causal explanations violates,
in its own unique way, some classical intuitions pertaining to the notion of causality.
Relativization of counterfactual statements to a particular inertial frame of reference
has the immediate consequence that the causal nexus itself loses its status of an objec-
tive, perspective-independent feature of the world. The remaining two stories retain
the objective and relativistically-invariant sense of causality, but imply that the causal
connections present in quantum entangled systems possess some rather non-standard
properties. According to the narrow fixed past approach the causal nexus directly con-
nects the outcomes revealed in space-like separated parts of the entangled system.
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However, the most controversial aspect of this analysis, apart from the obvious non-
local character of the causal link involved, is that it entails that each outcome-event
plays two distinct roles: that of a cause and an effect of the other event. Due to this
symmetric character, the relation between both events looks more like an instance of
a common cause rather than direct causation. However, as the existence of a common
cause is excluded by the Bell-type arguments, we are left with a case of causal bidirec-
tional correlations between space-like separated and indeterministic events. Speaking
metaphorically, distant outcomes appear to be mutually coordinated in a causal way
rather than causing one another or being caused by an external factor.
The third causal analysis of the quantum non-local correlations is even more com-
plex.Whenwe identify the counterfactually fixed past of an eventwith the complement
of its future light cone, the consequence of this assumption is that each measurement
non-locally causes the emergence of a sure-fire disposition of the distant correlated
system, which in turn is responsible (in an entirely local way) for revealing a unique
outcome of measurement. This story works in an almost perfectly intuitive way when
limited to each measurement separately, but when these measurements are analyzed
jointly, inevitable circularity ensues. That is, the L-measurement, together with its
outcome, creates the sure-fire disposition to reveal the correlated outcome on the
R-system. The R-measurement, in turn, actualizes this disposition by producing the
appropriate outcome, but in addition to that it also creates non-locally the requisite
disposition of the L-system, actualized in its measurement. Nowhere in this looped
chain of events can we identify a point at which it can be said that an indeterministic
selection of an outcome of measurement is taking place, as prescribed by the rules of
ordinary quantum mechanics. Each measurement seems to reveal a preexisting value
of the considered observable, whose presence is causally explained by the non-local
influence of the other measurement and its outcome. While this story does not imme-
diately appear to be internally inconsistent (nor, as it seems, does it directly contradict
any principle of quantum mechanics or relativity32), it certainly leaves us with the
uneasy feeling of not completely understanding the causal mechanism behind the
observed phenomena. Unfortunately, it is doubtful that a more satisfactory story can
be told without leaving the confines of the standard collapse interpretation of quantum
mechanics.
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